

15-45-E289a3

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge & Richard Kennedy

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on Cambodia - June 17, 1970

Items for discussion at this meeting include:

- Review of positive steps taken to aid Cambodia in the supply, military assistance, intelligence, and diplomatic fields.
 - Radio transmitters for Cambodia.
 - Costs to the U.S. of assistance to Cambodia.
 - Cambodia MAP Program (FY 71).
 - The Green Triangle situation.
1. Review of positive steps taken to aid Cambodia.

At the WSAG meeting of June 15, you informed the group that you would begin by asking for this review.

A. Supply

- ✓ -- Where do we now stand on supplying captured arms from the sanctuaries to the Cambodians? Do we have MACV's plan for supply and training? (Ask Admiral Moorer, who should have an updated listing of arms from MACV and the latest on the MACV plan.)

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✓
[Redacted Box]
NSS, OSD, DOS, DIA review(s) completed

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[Redacted]

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-- What do we know about Cambodian military training and ability to absorb help? (Admiral Moorer should know or be asked to find out.)

B. Military Assistance

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-- Where do we stand on the use [Redacted] in Cambodia? (Ask Ambassador Johnson.)

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[Redacted]

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-- What are we doing by way of aerial interdiction in Cambodia? By tacair? (Ask Admiral Moorer or Packard.)

-- What is the GVN providing by way of air support to the Cambodians? (Ask Admiral Moorer.)

-- What is the ARVN doing operationally on the ground in Cambodia to relieve pressure on the Cambodians? (Ask Admiral Moorer.)

C. Intelligence

✓

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D. Diplomatic

- What are we doing diplomatically to generate support for the Cambodians? (Ask Ambassador Johnson for a run-down.)
- ✓ -- Should we be doing anything more? For example, should we be encouraging the ROKs, the Japanese, the New Zealanders, or others, to help Cambodia? (Ask Ambassador Johnson.)
- ✓ -- What is the status of the Indonesian/Malaysian/Japanese follow-up to the Djakarta Conference? (Ask Ambassador Johnson.)
- ✓ -- Have we heard more from the Soviets? Do we know anything more about Firyubin's visit? (Ask Mr. Helms and Ambassador Johnson.)
- (If we have no word on Firyubin, you may wish to raise the question of our seeking him out for discussions.)

2. Radio Transmitters for Cambodia.

- The WSAG Working Group has drafted a set of recommendations (Tab 1) for providing the Cambodians with radio transmitters to rebroadcast Radio Cambodia programs into areas of Cambodia which presently cannot be reached. Australian help would be solicited, and we would also train Cambodian technicians.
- The recommendations appear very cogent and positive, and should cause no problem. There is, however, one item which the WSAG might consider: the retention of an EC-121 aircraft after a proposed redeployment date to CONUS of July 1, for missions over South Vietnam near Cambodia and possibly over Cambodia to rebroadcast Radio Cambodia tapes.

Questions you may wish to raise:

- Is there general agreement on the recommendations of the WSAG Working Group? Is the equipment readily available?

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-- Are there any problems in retaining the EC-121 on station after July 1? (This appears to be a desirable move, but Defense may have objections on budgetary grounds. If so, you might ask for suitable alternatives, if any.)

-- Can we expect full cooperation from the Cambodians? (Probably; they are aware of their deficiencies in the psyops field.)

-- Should we clear the cable transmitting the recommendations to the field? (See Tab 2)

3. Costs to the U.S. of Assistance to Cambodia

-- As our aid to Cambodia begins to mount up in terms of direct supplies of arms and equipment and indirect support through third countries, our financial load is also increasing.

-- You have directed that a number of studies be prepared on costs. However, another related issue is the budgetary categories from which these costs are to be met. We should be sure that the agencies involved are fully capable of meeting their burdens.

Questions which you might wish to raise:

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-- Do the agencies involved in all these aid efforts have adequate funds in their respective budgets? (A continuous, close check will be required. Perhaps a weekly report is in order.)

4. Cambodia MAP Program (FY 71). A cable on this is at Tab 4.

-- A program of \$15-25 million is being considered. We need to move quickly on this to fix the amount, the items and the priorities for delivery.

-- When will this program be spelled out in detail? (Ask DOD for a specific date -- it should be within the next two or three weeks.)

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- What priority will be given to delivery? (It must be a high priority if equipment is to arrive within the next few months.)

5. The Green Triangle Situation

- In the incoming cable at Tab 5, Phnom Penh wondered if consideration should not be given to the possible use of Cambodian bases in the Green Triangle as forward areas from which the Cambodian Army could possibly harass LOC's at some future date.
- At the June 4 WSAG meeting, you asked for a cable to be sent to MACV asking for its reaction to Phnom Penh's suggestion.
- The DATT in Phnom Penh now wants to give logistical support at "no cost to MAP" (Tab 6).

Questions which you may wish to address:

- Should reconsideration be given to support for Cambodian forces in the Green Triangle in order to permit operations to be staged from this region against LOC's? What do we say to the DATT request?
- Have we heard from MACV concerning this matter?

6. Other (If Time Permits)

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JUNE 16, 1970
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE WSAG

FROM : WSAG Cambodia Working Group

SUBJECT: Cambodian Assistance: Radio Transmitter

The WSAG has asked this Working Group to review the question of Cambodian radio transmitting facilities and to prepare recommendations to improve Cambodian internal capabilities if this is required. The Embassy at Phnom Penh has indicated that one of the first requests which the Cambodian Government made to it was for assistance in improving radio transmission facilities over all of the country. The same request was made by the GOC to the RTG and through them to us. According to the Embassy, Radio Phnom Penh cannot be heard in such spots as Kampong Som (Sihanoukville) whereas Radio Peking and Hanoi come in loud and clear.

BACKGROUND:

For general broadcasting Cambodia has one station at Phnom Penh (Radio Cambodia) and a rebroadcast station at Battambang in the west. Radio Cambodia uses two Phillips transmitters bought in 1964 to replace two older Chicom transmitters. Since 1967 two modern Phillips (120 KW medium wave set and 50 KW shortwave set) have been used in domestic service. (Two Chinese sets, 15 KW shortwave and 20 KW medium wave, have been used for international broadcasts.) Other smaller transmitting sets are also available, including 2 10 KW Swiss-built sets and 2 one KW sets of U.S. origin. The Army (FANK) has a one KW shortwave transmitter.

Cambodia has about 100,000 receivers for its population of 6½ million, most of which are concentrated around Phnom Penh. However, increasing imports of inexpensive transistor sets contribute to a wider audience. Cambodia has about 25,000 TV sets and one transmitter in Phnom Penh.

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SECRET/NODIS2POSSIBLE ACTIONS:

On the basis of the Embassy's recommendations that increased area and frequency coverage is desirable, the Working Group has looked at a number of alternatives. The Working Group believes that psyops in support of the GOC must be planned and conducted by the GOC, and sees the U.S. role as limited to providing the necessary equipment and, if required, training in its operation and maintenance. We see positive advantages to providing the GOC with an expanded radio transmitting capability as rapidly as possible, including: (a) an increased ability to reach all of its citizens having radio sets, and (b) the ability actively to counter Radio Peking and Hanoi, which we understand have increased their Cambodian language programs. We do not believe U.S. assets or U.S. programming directed towards Cambodia should be increased at this time.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Immediate. We should begin use of the U.S. Navy EC-121 (Project Jenny) aircraft Blue Eagle I as soon as possible to carry taped programs provided by Radio Cambodia. It should operate over RVN if at all possible, although operation over Cambodia with GOC permission should not be excluded if technically required. The aircraft should be devoted exclusively to carrying Cambodian material for Radio Cambodia. Blue Eagle I would not use Phnom Penh airport, but would receive tapes outside of Cambodia for broadcast. Blue Eagle I is due for redeployment to CONUS July 1. This should be delayed, if necessary. Use of the Blue Eagle I, which is immediately available, will enable the U.S. to provide immediate assistance to Cambodia while other longer term solutions are being developed. In addition, civilian radio engineers (preferably third country, but if necessary U.S. nationals) should be provided to help upgrade the capability of current Cambodian equipment.

B. Short Term. The U.S. Navy's 10 KW transmitter should be deployed, on a loan basis, to fill the priority gaps where Radio Cambodia does not reach. The Blue Eagle would provide

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broadcasts while Cambodian technicians are being trained in the use of this equipment. The Navy transmitters would be returned when the Australians or others are able to provide an additional radio transmitter to Cambodia.

C. Long Term. Follow up Under Secretary Johnson's initial discussions with Australian Ambassador Plimsoll in hopes of arranging to have Australia provide the GOC with a permanent 50 KW commercial set. Such a unit would cost between \$220-380 thousand, installed, if purchased on the open market. Training Cambodian technicians would require additional expense. Smaller 5/10 KW sets cost about \$70,000 installed and with spares. The Australians may prefer to provide several of these in lieu of the 50 KW set. If the Australians continue interested, we should urge them to work with Cambodians on the most efficient arrangements for reaching the largest number of Cambodian listeners.

D. We should consider asking Japanese to provide low cost, battery operated transistor receiver for Cambodian villages without adequate receiving equipment.

E. We understand that additional U.S. and Cambodian psyops options will be considered by the Interagency Cambodian Informational Task Force which is preparing a report for the WSAG.

Attached for WSAG approval is a cable which instructs the field to move ahead on the above proposals.

Attachment:
Stated.

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6/16/70
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ACTION: AmEmbassy PHNOM PENH
CINCPAC
AmEmbassy SAIGON
COMUSMACV

INFO: AmEmbassy CANBERRA
AmEmbassy BANGKOK

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: Cambodian Assistance: Radio Transmitters

REF: (a) State 092869 (NOTAL)
(b) State 091975 (NOTAL)
(c) Phnom Penh 1252 (NOTAL)

1. It has been decided to assist Cambodians on an immediate basis to improve domestic radio coverage of country to increase Government contacts with the population and to counter increased Cambodian language programming by Radio Peking and Hanoi.

2. As soon as Embassy Phnom Penh can arrange with Radio Cambodia to begin receiving Cambodian radio tapes, we will initiate use of Blue Eagle I, a U.S. Navy EC-121 (Project Jenny) aircraft to rebroadcast taped programs. Blue Eagle I should operate over RVN if at all possible, although operations over Cambodia with COC permission should not be excluded if technically required to cover gaps in

exclusively to carrying Cambodian produced material for Radio Cambodia. Blue Eagle I will not RPT not use Phnom Penh Airport or any other landing area in Cambodia. Blue Eagle I redeployment to CONUS on July 1 should be delayed pending development of longer term solutions to increasing coverage of Radio Cambodia. Embassy Phnom Penh should inform GOC immediately of above, secure their cooperation, and arrange with Saigon and COMUSMACV for forwarding of radio tapes and coordination of Blue Eagle I with present radio Cambodia programing.

4. To fill in behind Blue Eagle I operation, and as required to fill priority radio coverage gaps such as that identified by Embassy at Kampong Son (Sihanoukville), we are prepared to loan on an urgent basis a U.S. Navy 10 KW mobile radio transmitter. Embassy will be provided

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24 : LOC-HAK-523-1-9-0
directly by CINCPAC with information necessary to determine
Cambodian capability to use this equipment. If Cambodians
unable to do so with present Cambodian engineering staffs,
we are willing to consider training program outside of
Cambodia to prepare GOC technicians for operation of this
equipment. Equipment would not RPT not be operated by U.S.
military or civilian personnel.

5. ^{is requested to} [We hope] Embassy Canberra [will] follow up Under Secretary
Johnson's initial discussions with Australian Ambassador
Plimsoll, on question of Australia providing GOC with
permanent 50 KW commercial set (ref tel B). We are pro-
viding Plimsoll with paper describing GOC needs and actions
we propose to take for their background, and will forward
copy to Embassy Canberra soonest. Embassy Phnom Penh
should be prepared to discuss with GOC possibility of
making direct request to Australians, if Embassy Canberra's
discussions indicate Australia would be receptive to pro-
viding some assistance in this area. A 50 KW commercial
transmitter set is available at a price between \$220-380
thousand, installed, if purchased on the open market.
Smaller 5/10 KW sets cost about \$70,000, installed with
spares.

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6. Embassy Phnom Penh may also wish to discuss with GOC possibility of their requesting Japanese to provide a number of low cost, battery operated transistor receivers for Cambodian villages now without adequate receiving equipment, in order to enhance that side of GOC up graded efforts to reach its population by radio.

DRAFTED BY:

J:TRPickering/bjk | x-21599

APPROVED BY:

J - U. Alexis Johnson

CLEARANCES: DOD/ISA- Adm Flanagan

JCS- Gen Glick

White House- Mr. Holdridge

CIA-


EA- Mr. Green

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

C/S-HK-E28963

June 11, 1970

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF WSAG

FROM: WSAG Cambodia Working Group

SUBJECT: Cambodia Costs

The Working Group has summarized in the following spread-sheet (so far as figures are now available) the costs involved in our military assistance to Cambodia. The FY'70 MAP costs are broken down at Annex A and separate package costs of material delivered, projected to be delivered, and authorized for FY'70 MAP are at Annex B. Other costs have been derived from material provided by the Central Intelligence Agency on June 5 and June 11 which is included as Annex C through Annex I.

Attachments:

"Cambodia Costs", with
Annexes A through I.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24 : LOC-HAK-523-1-9-0

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FROM: SECDEF

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: COMUSMACV
AMEMB PHNOM PENH
AMEMB SAIGON
AMEMB BANGKOK
AMEMB VIENTIANE

DIST: STATE CJCS J5 J3 CSA CNO CSAF

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: FY 71 CAMBODIA MAP PLANNING GUIDNACE

REFERENCE: ~~★~~ DEFENSE 9682 ~~R. CINCPAC-260501Z MAY 70~~

1. (C) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, YOU MAY ASSUME THAT NECESSARY PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION FOR FY 71 CAMBODIA MAP WILL BE MADE ON 1 JULY OR THAT OTHER ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE 1 JULY TO MAKE CAMBODIA ELIGIBLE MA RECIPIENT DURING FY 71.
2. (S) ALSO FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, CEILING OF \$25 MILLION INCLUDING \$3 MILLION FOR SUPPLY OPERATIONS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR FY 71 CAMBODIA MAP. REQUIREMENTS BEYOND THAT CEILING SHOULD BE PLACED IN SHORTFALL.
3. (C) CAMBODIA WILL CONTINUE ELIGIBLE FOR LONG SUPPLY AND EXCESS UNDER ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES, (MAPEX, MIMEX, AND SIMEX) AND SHOULD RECEIVE CAPTURED STOCKS ON A PRIORITY BASIS UNDER MAPEX PROCEDURES.
4. (S) GUIDELINES FOR FY 71 REMAIN SAME AS TENTATIVE GUIDELINES FOR THE FY 70 C PACKAGE REGARDING FORCE LEVEL, AVOIDANCE OF EXPENSIVE ADDON EQUIPMENT, EMPHASIS ON BUILDING ON EXISTING CAMBODIAN ASSETS, AND SPECIFIED NEEDS OF FANK, CAF, AND CAMBODIAN NAVY EXCEPT THAT THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED:

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A. ATTRITION AIRCRAFT;

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B. RESUPPLY ONLY (NOT INITIAL COST) FOR FOUR 1000-MAN PACKS;

D. SPARES AND MUNITIONS SUPPORT FOR CAF.

6. (S) TRAINING TO MEET IMMEDIATE NEEDS SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED. PLAN TO MAXIMIZE USE OF THIRD COUNTRY FACILITIES AND ASSISTANCE FOR TRAINING. TRAINING BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES MAY BE PROGRAMMED AT U. S. BASES IN PACOM.

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8. (S) PREPARE A FY71 MAP FOR CAMBODIA AND SUBMIT FOLLOWING BY 25 JUNE:

A. A MESSAGE SUMMARIZING THE DIVISION OF RESOURCES AND QUANTITIES OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT.

B. THE PROGRAM DATA FOR FY71 MAP.

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24 : LOC-HAK-523-1-9-0